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ABSTRACT 
Mobile devices are playing an increasingly intimate role in 
everyday life.  However, users can be surprised when in-
formed of the data collection and distribution activities of 
apps they install. We report on two studies of smartphone 
users in western European countries, in which users were 
confronted with app behaviors and their reactions assessed.  
Users felt their personal space had been violated in 
“creepy” ways.  Using Altman’s notions of personal space 
and territoriality, and Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual 
integrity, we account for these emotional reactions and sug-
gest that they point to important underlying issues, even 
when users continue using apps they find creepy.  
Author Keywords 
Mobile devices; data privacy; bodily integrity; learned help-
lessness; creepiness; 
ACM Classification Keywords 
H.5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.  
INTRODUCTION 
“I feel like I am constantly tracked either on my phone or 
on my computer, at stores, etc. I feel like this is a part of 
daily life now” – Survey, USA 
What does it mean to “feel” like you are constantly tracked 
by unseen and largely unknown entities? In the quote above 
who was doing the tracking was not named and for most of 
our respondents through the interviews and the survey they 
remained unknown, largely abstract entities that somehow 
collect personal, sometimes even intimate information. 
With the rise of personal computing in the 1980s and espe-
cially of the world-wide web in the 1990s and 2000s, and 
the movement of computers out of offices and into homes, 
computing became understood as technology of mass con-
sumption and marketing, raising new questions about con-
sumer tracking (especially via web cookies) and targeting 
[24]. Mass data collection is becoming “designed in” to 
everyday life [36] as we increasingly rely on technologies 
capable of monitoring, storing and distributing information 
about us. Occasionally data collection by governments, 
organizations, corporations or even small application de-
velopers comes to light causing a public outcry [39]. Yet 
much of the tracking and data collection does not necessari-
ly happen with insidious goals, but is a result of businesses 
attempting to deliver personalized services and advertising 
more effectively [40]. Despite potentially positive outcomes 
of this kind of tracking, the public response remains nega-
tive often because people simply find it creepy. At the same 
time, people continue to use the technologies and applica-
tions implicated in data collection even as they express out-
rage over such activities. This is typically seen as an ex-
pression of the “privacy paradox” where intentions and 
behaviors around information disclosure often radically 
differ [2,32,40]. 
Over the last decade, especially since the launch of the first 
app store by Apple in 2008, computing has moved out of 
the home and into our pockets, purses, hands, and even 
bedsides, bringing with it a new wave of concerns, increas-
ingly framed in terms of “creepiness.” We will define 
creepy more carefully later on in the paper but we note here 
that we use this term to denote an emotional response to a 
sense of wrongness that is difficult to clearly articulate. We 
argue that the notion of creepiness is a concept worth un-
packing, and by way of example analyze a corpus of data 
recently collected from smartphone app users in a number 
of western countries using perspectives of bodily integrity, 
personal space and territoriality [3,30,31,34].  
From this analysis a different notion of “users” emerges. 
Listening closely and empathically to our study partici-
pants, more than seeing them just as decision-making 
agents, we began to identify them as people1 caught up in a 
                                                            
1 For the purposes of this paper, when we say “people” we are 
referring to fairly affluent consumers in developed Western coun-
tries.  Questions of personal space and privacy are clearly cultural-
ly dependent, and from, e.g., Chinese or Global South perspectives 
smartphones may have very different meanings. 
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bind over the limits of their personal space: On the one 
hand, smartphones felt like intimate zones and extensions 
of their bodies. On the other hand, in order to empower 
themselves through this boundary-enlarging technology, 
they felt they had to accept the possibility of unknown, for-
eign access into this zone of expanded intimacy. Reframing 
the “privacy paradox” in these terms opens different oppor-
tunities and responsibilities for technology development 
and policy design. 
SMARTPHONES AS EXTENSIONS OF THE SELF 
Ubiquitous, nearly infinitely personalizable and most often 
individually owned at least in the Western world, mobile 
phones have variously been discussed as deeply personal 
extensions of the self [26,29] or even organic parts of the 
self [23,33]. As mobile technologies developed and become 
domesticated, smartphones have moved from an expensive 
curiosity to a commodity deeply integrated into their users' 
everyday lives. The functions these devices perform are not 
just about practical problem solving, escapist entertainment 
or convenient extensions of sociability, but also about pro-
jecting and constructing the self [12].  
Like our homes, smartphones are implicated in the way of 
being and deeply embedded in the life experience. Yet in 
HCI research aesthetic or emotional experiences are less of 
a concern than the serious business of sociability, friend-
ship, collaboration and getting ahead in life. Finding a par-
ticular experience “creepy” is a kind of emotional experi-
ence, but it can also serve as an indication of a disjuncture 
between the way developers and users experience and in-
terpret functions or applications. Much of the discussion of 
discomfort or feelings of creepiness in the course of tech-
nology use in HCI has been conflated with user privacy 
concerns of data access and security. We use two theoreti-
cal frameworks familiar to HCI researchers for thinking 
about privacy, but extend the conversation to consider how 
creepiness might be conceptualized in this context.   
Altman’s notions of personal space and territoriality 
Irwin Altman’s theory of privacy regulation has been dis-
cussed in prior work [34]. Altman conceptualizes privacy as 
a process through which people attempt to achieve a desired 
privacy level in any situation in life by selectively adjusting 
access to themselves through controlling information they 
disclose or receive [3]. In other words, people keep secrets 
and manage themselves and their secrets through ongoing 
acts of revealing and concealment [30]. Altman conceptual-
ized privacy as one of the four key concepts central to the 
study of environment and social behavior: privacy, personal 
space, territoriality and crowding. Altman explains personal 
space and territorial behavior as mechanisms people use in 
the service of privacy goals to regulate interpersonal 
boundaries and environmental factors.  
Personal space is typically conceptualized as a “boundary 
around a person, intrusion into which is often uncomforta-
ble and generally not permitted” [3]. Intrusions or invasions 
of personal space represent privacy violations and can result 
in a variety of responses from feelings of anxiety to actions 
designed to increase distance and reduce interaction. 
Territorial behavior is another type of a social regulation 
mechanism.  Altman argues that just like animals are terri-
torial about their feeding or mating areas, people also re-
gard certain places and objects as their personal or primary 
territories. A primary territory usually refers to an area, a 
place or an object that fulfills certain needs or motives and 
where ownership is clearly conveyed through some form of 
personalization. Entry into another person’s primary territo-
ry is typically done with permission only and trespassing is 
considered an invasion that can elicit intense emotional 
responses and physical action [3]. 
Several researchers have explored user decisions to allow 
physical access to their smartphones and personal data, 
showing that people regard their phone as highly private 
and are reluctant to share it with others, expressing discom-
fort even when sharing it with close friends [16,17]. Re-
search has also shown that smartphone users are surprised 
and feel violated when they find out that applications are 
accessing data on their smartphones ostensibly without their 
knowledge [10,25]. In other words they feel that this data 
access breaches their privacy norms and should be done 
with their informed consent, the same reaction people show 
when their primary territory is breached.  
Increased computerization affects individuals and society as 
a whole as it brings increased imbalance in power between 
individuals and large institutions. In the case of 
smartphones, the power balance between the smartphone 
user and the application developers is quite uneven. The 
user has few means of safeguarding his territory and often 
she is unaware of the encroachment. Her options include 
shifting the desired level of privacy towards the actual lev-
el; a common approach used when repeated attempts to 
regulate privacy have failed.  
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity model 
Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity com-
plements Altman’s notions of personal space by calling 
attention to context-dependent social norms and regulated 
information flows [31].  Even from within the most private, 
personal space, people never interact with information in 
the abstract, but always as it is embedded in a particular 
social context.  Nissenbaum defines contexts as “structured 
social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, 
relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and inter-
nal values (goals, ends, purposes)” [31].  Smartphones may 
be extensions of personal space, in Altman’s terms, but 
through them people participate in a variety of quite differ-
ent contexts. These may indeed vary on an app-by-app ba-
sis: what is socially legitimate information sharing for a 
health app might include highly sensitive information about 
one’s body and behaviors, whereas what it is socially legit-
imate for a game like Fruit Ninja to share, while difficult to 
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precisely define and probably not yet worked out by its 
many stakeholders, is sure to be much less sensitive. 
Contextual integrity is maintained if information flows ac-
cording to contextual norms. However, digital technologies 
make it easy to disregard such norms either through igno-
rance or intentionally [4]. That a digital system is respecting 
contextual integrity may be difficult and expensive to at-
tain, often beyond the capabilities of any particular individ-
ual. However, individuals can sometimes (and dramatically) 
detect when a breach of norms has occurred when they see 
that information they consider off limits with respect to the 
context in which it was given is being used in ways anti-
thetical to its socially sanctioned expectations. 
What are we feeling when we are creeped out? 
Encountering a violation of contextual integrity of one’s 
information can result in a range of emotional responses, 
though it may not necessarily lead to outward action to al-
leviate the problem. One can be outraged, exasperated, hor-
rified, even cynically bemused. Along with or in addition to 
these, people often describe their discomfort by referencing 
the word “creepy”.  
Collins English dictionary defines creepy as “having or 
causing a sensation of repulsion, horror, or fear, as of crea-
tures crawling on the skin” [8]. The reference to creepy-
crawlies on the skin grounds this experience in a certain 
kind of fundamental, embodied boundary violation, in Alt-
man’s terms. In Nissenbaum’s terms, creepy information 
flows often involve realizations that personal secrets have 
been, or could be, revealed to those who have not been ex-
plicitly granted access to them. “Creepy” does not neces-
sarily signal that the end result (contextually appropriate 
advertisement for example) is not beneficial to the user, but 
to a kind of dual violation of deeply held expectations not 
just of “contextual integrity” in terms of respecting social 
norms, but “personal zone integrity” in terms of control 
over sensitive boundaries. 
TRACKING AND DATA LEAKAGE 
Discussions of information disclosure practices via mobile 
phones have been extensive though mostly focused on loca-
tion-based services and interpersonal information disclosure 
[22,28]. Researchers have turned their attention to 
smartphone app data distribution, often termed “data leak-
age” to third parties without direct owner notification only 
recently [25]. Ostensibly, users give permission for 
smartphone applications to access their use data and to uti-
lize it for a range of purposes when they press "agree" on 
the End User License Agreement (EULA) screen in the 
process of installing a smartphone application. Despite this, 
revelations of data distribution by many common applica-
tions to third party advertisers have resulted in expressions 
of concern and discomfort by smartphone users 
[9,10,19,25]. 
Where does the data go? 
In a survey of 5000 mobile users reported by Think In-
sights, 82% of the participants claimed to notice ads on 
their smartphones and 49% had taken action based on those 
ads2. Advertising in applications has a substantial effect on 
users and their purchase patterns. The global mobile adver-
tising market was valued around 5.3 billion dollars in the 
year 2012 illustrating just how valuable it is for advertisers 
to have access to user patterns and personal data [14]. Ad 
libraries and analytic companies buy the data that 
smartphone apps collect, analyzing and aggregating user 
data to build a profile for targeted advertising.  
Imagine a smartphone owner who has on her phone a typi-
cal flashlight application like the High-Powered Flashlight 
from iHandy inc., and a simple one-player game application 
like Fruit Ninja from Halfbrick Studios. Both apps require 
access to the phone number and device ID, the remote 
number if a call is active and which other applications are 
used on the device. Additionally the flashlight app has ac-
cess to precise location, hardware controls and system tools 
that enable it to change system configuration and display 
settings. The Fruit Ninja app also requires access to the list 
of accounts known by the device. The information these 
apps collect is sold to several third parties, one of which is 
Flurry, a big ad and analytics company that according to its 
website prides itself on taking in two terabytes of data from 
2.8 billion app sessions per day [11]. Flurry buys data from 
both these apps and can build a profile of a user that in-
cludes information about what type of phone she has, what 
applications she uses and how frequently, what accounts 
she has on her phone, which numbers she calls (which can 
link to other consumer profiles in the Flurry database) and 
precise location of the phone which, if logged with 
timestamps, gives an accurate estimate of where she lives, 
works and travels. By properly aggregating this information 
the company gets a detailed profile of her as a consumer, 
information that is worth money.  
Smartphone users’ response to tracking and data collection 
as well as the willingness to share data with others varies 
but users are invariably surprised at the extent of data leak-
age on their phones [5,22,25]. Although many are willing to 
share data with developers in the right context, particularly 
when the type of information collected and its purpose is 
made clear, it is difficult to justify why gaming applications 
that are about fruit slicing or sling shooting birds would 
need the user’s location, phone number or information 
about other running apps. The user in the example above 
has given her permission for the Flashlight and Fruit Ninja 
apps to collect and distribute her information at the point of 
installation when she clicked through the End User License 
Agreement (EULA). Yet smartphone users often have little 
                                                            
2 Think Insights by Google reporting on a study conducted by 
Ipsos OTX. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/SRTh4  
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understanding of which permissions they consent to and 
what these mean. Moreover, studies show that most users 
simply ignore permissions completely [9,10]. People ignore 
EULAs for various reasons, for example warning fatigue 
[10], lack of motivation [15], or an overriding desire to in-
stall the app where reading the EULA is seen as a cost 
without a clear benefit [25].  
“Data leakage” at one level appears to be a misnomer — 
the data flows the app is enabling are most likely not acci-
dental oversights or unintended consequences, but central to 
the business model the makes the app possible in the first 
place.  “Intended data distribution” would seem more apt a 
term and this is how tracking is often included in EULA.  
However, upon closer inspection, calling this leakage cap-
tures an important aspect of the consequences of installing 
the app:  if the user conceptualized her personal space as 
having integrity, and a more-or-less controllable border, 
from her perspective the app makes this border “leaky”, and 
intentionally so. 
While ensuring readability and usability of EULA is im-
portant, here we consider why people continue to use apps 
even when they know these apps reveal personal data to 
advertisers. We also discuss why it is important to consider 
these issues both at the individual level and in the broader 
social context. The studies we present consider what it 
means to loose control over access to the self to unknown 
third parties with few concrete or obvious consequences. 
Why does it matter that third-party advertisers can gain 
access to certain types of personal information via 
smartphones? How do people react to finding this out and 
what might they be willing to do about it? 
STUDYING ATTITUDES TOWARD DATA LEAKAGE 
We conducted two studies investigating how smartphone 
users feel about data access on their phones. The first study 
was a qualitative investigation conducted in two countries 
in order to assess whether smartphone users may be willing 
to change their behavior once they have been informed 
about tracking and data leakage. We exposed our partici-
pants to data leakage to see if they made changes in their 
user patterns when informed of potential privacy breaches. 
In the second study we conducted a survey on an interna-
tional opportunity sample where we explored how data pri-
vacy sentiments might affect smartphone users when choos-
ing and downloading applications. Furthermore we ex-
plored how important it was for our participants to maintain 
their privacy while using applications on smartphones. 
Study 1 — Interviews 
In February 2013 we conducted 13 semi-structured inter-
views in two countries: 6 in Iceland 7 in Denmark. We re-
cruited users from our own personal networks and by ad-
vertising on Facebook. The prerequisite was that our users 
owned and used Android smartphones and were between 25 
and 60 years of age. Our sample consisted of 8 men and 5 
women, and the age distribution was between 27 and 55 
years with a mean of 33,5. 
We chose to use the Android OS as our research platform 
because the system presents the user with the permission 
screen each time she downloads an application. Our partici-
pants then would have encountered the terms of use more 
often than an iOS smartphone user.  
The interviews were conducted in English, Danish or Ice-
landic depending on participant preference and lasted 40-70 
minutes each. We started with general questions regarding 
smartphones and applications and then asked participants to 
think aloud while demonstrating how they usually go about 
accessing the Google Play Store on their mobile phones and 
downloading an application of their choosing. After our 
participants downloaded an app, we moved on to questions 
regarding attitudes and beliefs about data privacy. We also 
asked users what they think their apps do with the data they 
access, to get insight into participants’ mental models of 
data security on smartphones. 
In the second half of the interview we introduced some of 
the most common permission statements found on popular 
apps in Google Play and discussed what they mean. We 
also showed them a website that allows users to scan apps, 
and asked users to download an app in Google Play that 
scans permissions and analytic libraries connected to apps 
currently located on the user’s mobile phone3. Finally, we 
asked participants to download and try out a popular game 
on Google Play, Fruit Ninja, then explained its main func-
tions and discussed the permissions our users had accepted 
before downloading the app to their mobile devices. 
Three weeks after the initial interviews we sent our partici-
pants a follow-up questionnaire where we asked them ques-
tions regarding their use patterns and conducted a follow up 
interview via email or phone. All interviews were tran-
scribed and coded. We used an iterative analysis process of 
open and thematic coding throughout the data collection 
process. This allowed us to test emergent themes in follow 
up interviews.  
Study 2 — Survey 
In March and April of 2013 we deployed a survey to gain a 
better understanding of privacy sentiments of smartphone 
users more broadly. We obtained an opportunity sample by 
recruiting via our own networks on Facebook and by send-
ing participation requests to university student mailing lists 
in Iceland and Denmark. A total of 272 respondents an-
swered our survey and 187 completed it (116 women and 
71 men). Although this was an opportunity sample it was 
quite diverse. The majority of participants were between the 
                                                            
3 In our study we used http://privacyscore.com/mobilescan and 
Addons Detector by denper available from the Google Play store 
http://goo.gl/TM9g2  
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ages of 25 and 44 (81%) although participants ranged in age 
from 18 to 74. Over 60% were highly educated (graduate 
degree) and approximately 13% had less than a bachelor 
degree. Most of the respondents lived in Denmark (43%), 
Iceland (20%), USA (20%) and Sweden (10%). However, 
the sample included participants from 12 countries. Alt-
hough slightly over half of our respondents were veteran 
smartphone users (51%), having used a smartphone for over 
2 years, 18% were new to the smartphone world, having 
used the device for less than a year. 
We measured attitudes toward app stores, personalized ad-
vertising and general sentiment toward data collection by 
businesses as well as the general level of concern about 
threats to personal privacy. We also developed a set of 
questions focused specifically on attitudes towards data 
collection and management by smartphone apps.  
In order to measure attitudes toward data collection by mo-
bile applications respondents were randomly presented with 
either Fruit Ninja game app or Flashlight app with the de-
veloper description of the app. Below the description we 
listed permissions that the app requires the user to agree to 
before downloading and asked respondents to indicate 
which they felt permissions were appropriate or inappropri-
ate given the functionality of the app.  
On the next page we explained which ad-libraries and ana-
lytics companies received the data the apps collected from 
the mobile phones and added the explanation these compa-
nies generally give for how this data is utilized. We fol-
lowed up with questions regarding awareness about data 
collection and distribution in mobile applications and 
whether participants read the EULA prior to downloading 
apps. The final question of the survey was free response, 
asking users to share how they felt about data distribution to 
third parties in general. Due to space constraints all survey 
instruments are available upon request. 
Nearly 50% (89 of 187) of participants that had completed 
the survey responded to this question and we coded these 
responses using an iterative coding process by moving from 
an initial open coding through axial and thematic coding to 
distill thematic categories. Where necessary, quotes pre-
sented in this paper were translated from Icelandic or Dan-
ish. Quotes and excerpts are marked Interview or Survey to 
indicate the source and Country to indicate location of the 
respondent. 
FINDINGS 
In broad strokes, many of our findings confirmed other 
studies of attitudes toward mobile phone data leakage and 
privacy. Similar to the findings in [7] our interview partici-
pants became more concerned with data leakage as a kind 
of privacy violation throughout the interview. Similar to 
findings in [25] they also indicated that these privacy con-
cerns were often overridden by other factors when they 
made decisions about whether to install a particular applica-
tion. As in [9,10,17] our participants had strong opinions on 
what data they considered sensitive (emails, images and 
messages) and substantial misconceptions about what data 
applications they used were accessing on their mobile 
phone, as has been noted by [10,25]. 
Just like the participants in [10] and [15] our interviewees 
ignored the EULA when they were asked to install an ap-
plication of their own choosing from the app store during 
the interview. Yet they had typically expressed concern 
about their privacy in the prior portion of the interview, 
discussing privacy implications of smartphone application 
data leakage. When asked why they had ignored the EULA 
two explanations dominated similar to those described in 
[9,18,25]. First, they had never had any real negative con-
sequences from data collection. Second, the desire to have 
the application trumped any concerns for data collection, 
which was explained away as “the way things are.” 
“Yes, I used to think about it, but I decided to stop it. I know 
I am agreeing to this (data collection). If I really want the 
app, I take my chances.” – interview, Denmark 
Other researchers have argued that it is important to rede-
sign the EULA to help users be more aware of what is go-
ing on in their smartphones [25,41]. In the final portion of 
the interview, participants were asked to install Fruit Ninja 
and researchers walked them through the EULA explaining 
all permissions requested by the application. Similar to 
[25], this exercise revealed a mismatch between the inter-
viewees’ mental models of what Fruit Ninja might reasona-
bly request in order to function and the kind of data it actu-
ally requested. That is, they expected the data collected via 
the app to be contextually appropriate to a single-player 
game of slicing fruit. Not surprisingly, this mismatch 
caused participants significant discomfort similar to [9,24]: 
“I feel deceived, I had no idea it was this systematic” – in-
terview, Iceland 
During the follow-up interview three weeks later our partic-
ipants said they wanted to be more cautious and were trying 
to pay attention to what they were downloading and in-
stalling on their mobile phones. More than half (7 of 13) 
had deleted an application although in most cases it was 
Fruit Ninja: 
“I deleted Fruit Ninja because it was gathering a lot of in-
formation, although it might also be the case with other 
apps on the phone I don't want to delete them, I simply en-
joy them too much.” – interview, Iceland 
This was to be expected as it was not their choice to down-
load Fruit Ninja and the majority of our participants did not 
have prior experience with this app. Even though partici-
pants were not willing to trade personal data for useless 
applications they accepted the possibility that other more 
“meaningful” applications might be doing the same thing. 
Although some approached their smartphones with more 
caution they admitted they had not changed their practices 
very much:  
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“I just get the applications I want, I had forgotten all about 
this data gathering stuff.” – interview, Denmark 
Similar to findings in [15] and in slight contradiction to [18] 
the extensive explanations and demonstrations of what can 
be done to monitor privacy more closely, installation of 
detector applications on participants’ phones and introduc-
tions of trackers websites, our participants did not use these 
tools, or looked for new ones, because they regarded it as a 
waste of time: 
“I will never waste my time reading privacy policies, my 
time is simply too valuable. To some extent I just have to 
accept this.” – interview, Iceland 
The survey findings followed a similar pattern. Our partici-
pants were generally aware of data collection and distribu-
tion to third parties and believed that more data was collect-
ed than necessary. Nevertheless, few respondents restricted 
mobile data while using their phones. Indeed, 78% had data 
turned on continuously with 56% saying they use data a lot. 
Similar to findings in [10] nearly 57% said they had deleted 
an app and roughly 62% had aborted the installation pro-
cess of an application because of privacy concerns.  
Overall survey respondents were concerned about infor-
mation disclosure to businesses (mean=2.29, sd=.487, range 
0-3 where 3=high concern) and reported moderate levels of 
concern regarding threats to personal privacy (mean=2.01, 
sd=.466, range 0-3 where 3=high concern). Participants 
were also quite concerned about smartphone integrity and 
their privacy in regards to that, which manifested in low 
scores on our scale of how trusting smartphone users were 
toward the integrity of app stores and app developers 
(mean=1.23, sd=.65, range 0-3 where 3=highly trusting). 
Beyond the Privacy Paradox 
Results from both studies clearly illustrated what is com-
monly called a privacy paradox where our participants ex-
pressed concerns about data leakage, but their actions sug-
gested otherwise. In both studies participants expressed a 
desire for greater transparency and control over information 
disclosure. Where none of this is particularly surprising, we 
were struck by the fact that sentiments expressed by survey 
participants about data collection and smartphone usage 
seemed to fall into three broad categories (see Table 1). We 
then explored more closely the sentiments expressed by 
both survey and interview study participants about data 
leakage and why they said they continued to use their 
phones the way they did. Our findings suggest that the no-
tion of “privacy paradox” that is often used to explain these 
findings may obscure complex dynamics around technology 
use and data disclosure. 
Tracking is understandable 
Although the vast majority of responses in interviews and 
survey expressed significant distaste for tracking and third 
party data collection activities, some felt that there are legit-
imate reasons for data collection:  
“I see the purpose of collecting data for improving the ap-
plication behavior e.g. Amazon book suggestions, but I do 
not approve the selling of my data to third parties, especial-
ly when I am not getting a share of the revenue!” – survey, 
location undisclosed. 
After all, people did want personalization of services, alt-
hough they tended to identify these activities with expected, 
and thus contextually appropriate data usage. Others point-
ed to the typical business model of smartphone application 
and other online businesses, as they understood it:  
“I understand that this information is a revenue stream for 
free apps - but I believe it has gone too far” – survey, USA 
The reality of the information economy is such that in the 
course of mundane interactions with everyday technologies 
users move smoothly between consumption of services and 
production of content that is in turn monetized by service 
providers. This kind of information economy turns all data 
produced by consumers into commodities that are either fed 
back to the consumer through improved services and per-
sonalization or sold elsewhere. Many of our participants 
understood this dynamic quite well:  
“I understand the appeal from the developer's perspective -- 
being able to collect large amounts of data about users 
could be crucial to targeted ads and later versions of an 
app.” – survey, USA 
Alongside this understanding, most expressed concern for 
the amount of tracking and qualified their statements to 
Theme Code N 
Tracking is under-
standable  
Collecting data is OK 1 
Developers need it 6 
The concerned and 
the outraged 
Should be illegal 8 
Users need to be in-
formed / more control 7 
Dejected acceptance 
and compliance 
Nothing is free 6 
The user has to  
comply 14 
Tracking is Disturbing/Creepy 50 
Unconcerned "I do not care" 2 
Table 1: Thematic coding of qualitative data from the sur-
vey (total N=89, some statements were coded in more than 
one category) 
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caution about the run-away train of the scale of data collec-
tion. Many participants said they didn’t care if advertisers 
had data about their application usage or how many times 
they played a game on their phone during work hours. Yet a 
vague concern for how this data might eventually be used 
and interpreted remained:  
“I'm ok with them collecting some information about me, 
but it is a slippery slope and the developer should only en-
gage in the activity if they are willing to accept the conse-
quences and responsibility of handling it properly.” – sur-
vey, USA 
Most of our participants called for greater transparency, 
regardless of whether they approved of data collection or 
not. Identifying what kind of data is collected, where it is 
delivered and how it might be used is no small task and 
most of the time it is impossible. Even the most technically 
savvy smartphone users often do not conceptualize quite the 
extent of data leakage.  
The concerned and the outraged 
In most cases, news of data leakage elicited expressions of 
mild discomfort and references to creepiness: 
“I think it's creepy and makes me think about all the apps I 
have on my phone. I use flashlight very often and I find it 
disturbing that it can collect personal information off my 
phone” – survey, Iceland 
In several cases, however participants expressed significant 
outrage. When asked why, in all cases they explained they 
had not expected data collection to be quite so rampant, but 
perhaps the level of outrage was associated with the kinds 
of potential outcomes they envisioned: 
“This is completely ridiculous, I would not invite people 
into my closet, this is way out of line. No I don ́t find it ap-
propriate to give up personal information in exchange for 
this game and that they don ́t need more approval than they 
apparently do.” – interview, Denmark 
If we conceive of smartphones as extensions of the self then 
the owners expect informed consent prior to entry into these 
personal territories. In the quote above, the interviewee 
equates the smartphone to a closed personal space (a closet) 
— entry into which would require high levels of intimacy 
and trust. People react to these breaches in different ways. 
Some uninstalled the offending application immediately, 
while others called for some sort of regulation: 
“No such data collection and/or distribution should be 
permitted.” – survey, Denmark 
Curiously, only a few of our participants were able to artic-
ulate who it was that they expected to act as a gatekeeper 
for data collection and tracking. Several noted that this was 
the function of the app stores. Most, however, appealed to 
some sort of vague general policies or even laws that 
“ought to be in place.” Many also called for greater trans-
parency. After all, much of what goes on with user-
produced data, whether it is content on Google or data 
leaked by the Flashlight application on Android, is shroud-
ed in mystery:  
“There should be much stronger regulations against third-
party data collection and people should be better informed 
about this risk of third-party data collection” – survey, Ice-
land. 
Where the general sentiment here was that the practice of 
data collection and tracking should be somehow limited or 
stopped, only the very few actively limited their own app 
usage. Although many called for greater transparency, few 
admitted to reading the EULA before installing applications 
of their choice. In the vast majority of cases the same par-
ticipants expressed another sentiment, that of compliance in 
the face of constant demands on data.  
Dejected acceptance and compliance 
Taking care of private information on smartphones takes 
effort; reading the EULA, scanning the phone and monitor-
ing application updates which often involve increased num-
bers of permissions. Some of our participants stated that in 
order to use their smartphone they had to cave in and accept 
data collection. After all, what’s the harm anyway?  
“I don ́t know what can really be done [about data collec-
tion] because then you have to stop using the smartphone 
as a smartphone.” – interview, Denmark 
Others said that they had never experienced anything nega-
tive and therefore had lowered their threshold of privacy 
concerns. It has become a part of their expectations and the 
more that this continues to happen the more they will ex-
pect it. 
“This is just how these things develop and this will only get 
worse, we can not change it. But I don ́t see how I can be 
personally affected by them knowing stuff about me.” – in-
terview, Denmark 
Although people are willing to trade their personal data for 
a benefit their reaction is often not one of dismissal of pri-
vacy concerns but one of discomfort from the loss of con-
trol they feel. To some extent people want the option to be 
included in the negotiations, not to be robbed of their data. 
“There is not much you can do about this. If you want the 
app you just have to accept this. Otherwise you are not us-
ing the phone the way it was intended.” – interview, Iceland 
Our participants continued with their habits after being ex-
posed to the data leakage, saying that it is ‘good enough’. 
Nine of the 13 interviewees told us that although the infor-
mation they learned from us did not result in them changing 
how they used their phones, they didn’t quite feel as com-
fortable about it anymore.  
“The attitude has changed but the usage has not, I just feel 
a lot more uncomfortable using my phone” – interview, 
Denmark 
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The level of resignation was striking in most of these re-
sponses. More often than not, the explanation for why our 
participants didn’t spend the time to read the EULA, over-
looked that some of their favorite applications leak data and 
ignored the assortment of tools available for limiting data 
leakage of this kind was one of helpless compliance: 
“It's unsettling and not ok, but I feel very powerless against 
it.” – survey, Denmark. 
Although we might expect people to exhibit high levels of 
concern for their privacy, how can we expect them to act on 
these concerns if they are convinced that there is not much 
they can really do? According to Altman [3] such lack of 
recourse can result in adjustments to the desired privacy 
level towards actual privacy level. People do so when they 
feel that they have no boundary control options to fend off 
repeated encroachments. After all maybe we are not look-
ing at a privacy paradox. What we are seeing is a certain 
shift in norms and tensions between what our participants 
want, increased control and transparency and what they 
realize they can get. This is where our participants exhibit a 
pragmatic attitude and choose the benefits of owning and 
using a smartphone without limitations over the cost that 
comes with guarding their personal data from overprivi-
leged applications. Smartphone users do not want to unin-
stall all of their overprivileged applications. They accept 
that this is payment for getting something for “free”, and 
they feel at ease with paying for it as long as nothing nega-
tive happens, or as one respondent phrased it: 
“I believe the adage: "When you think you're getting a free 
lunch; you're actually being served to someone else." It's a 
trade-off for free entertainment.” – survey, USA 
From privacy paradox to learned helplessness 
Altman notes that repeated invasion into a primary territory 
can have serious consequences to a person’s self-identity 
and inability to regulate access can in the long run cause a 
lack of self-esteem [3]. Invading a person’s privacy is par-
amount to taking control of a person’s life away from that 
person which can seriously affect an individual’s autonomy 
and dignity [30]. According to Altman “it is a loss of con-
trol to others that is serious, not so much the mere exposure 
of information” [3]. Repeated invasions into a persons’ pri-
vacy and a conviction that there is no recourse can result in 
learned helplessness [23,30], when people stop responding 
to invasions even when presented with ways to defend 
themselves. Learned helplessness was originally identified 
in an experiment where a dog was put in an inescapable 
situation, as it was experiencing electric shock. Shortly 
thereafter, it was put into a different kennel where it could 
stop the shocks by performing a simple action. The dog did 
not attempt to evade the shocks; it just remained seated and 
stoically endured electric shocks, while the dogs in the con-
trol group quickly learned how to avoid the shocks [37].   
The conception of learned helplessness was subsequently 
developed into a theory of helplessness and personal control 
[1], applied to a variety of situations and identified as a 
significant factor in mental health. Learned helplessness 
typically happens when people come to believe that a situa-
tion is unchangeable or inescapable and will often construct 
reasons for why this is so even if solutions become availa-
ble later on. Consider the following statements: 
 “I silently accept it. When you make me think about it, I 
kind of don't like it, but have probably forgotten all about it 
next time I download an app.” – survey, Denmark 
“It seems like a necessary evil at this point. Because it is so 
ubiquitous, I think that it's likely that this sort of thing will 
never go away.” – survey, USA 
In both cases there is an implicit agreement that the re-
spondent has no way of affecting the situation and must 
accept it if they are to be able to go on. The implication 
here is that perhaps there are other explanations for what 
has been termed the privacy paradox [36], beyond decision-
making conundrums and situational constraints. 
DISCUSSION 
When informed of information sharing practices of certain 
apps on their smartphone, our research participants for the 
most part expressed dismay, even outrage — but then pro-
ceeded with business as usual when it came to using their 
smartphones. To the directed advertising industry, this can 
be seen as good news, suggesting that consumers may pro-
test information sharing but deep down do not really care 
enough to actually alter their behavior. 
We take from our findings a different message:  that at this 
stage in the smartphone era, many people are essentially 
creeped out (or, if they knew, would be creeped out) by the 
information sharing behaviors of the apps with which they 
have outfitted this extension of their personal space and 
primary territory. They may have formally agreed to it, and 
are able to rationalize their use of such apps when asked; 
and they may prefer to put the creepiness out of their minds 
in order to enjoy their moments of interacting with the apps; 
but this foundation of creepiness undermines and makes 
precarious the standing of the smartphone as part of daily 
life. From a business perspective, our finding is that any 
business model that depends on taking personal data from 
smartphone users without first establishing a solid basis for 
the level of emotional trust this entails is ripe for disruption. 
We do not see the solution to these privacy issues in im-
proving EULAs and in making informed consent more ro-
bust. Given that privacy concerns are generally rooted in 
complex social configurations, such approaches would 
seem to depend on people predicting that something might 
go badly and mitigating information flows on the front end. 
The reality is, however, that people have great difficulty 
predicting such outcomes because in fact there are far too 
many variables to consider - and the vast majority of times 
the negative consequences are the result of "not thinking" 
ahead. From a policy perspective then, the EULA hardly 
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qualifies as informed consent for this sort of data distribu-
tion to third parties. Instead, our analysis suggests that de-
signers of apps and their data sharing policies need to con-
front the nature of creepiness head on.  For this, we need a 
practical theory of creepiness, its varieties, and its temporal-
ities (e.g., does creepiness fade over time with familiarity, 
and if so, what replaces it?). This paper is a first step in this 
direction but much more work needs to be done.  
We also need apps that behave, and can be seen to behave, 
in ways that respect the user’s personal space and the integ-
rity of the context of use, much better than they currently 
do. Apps like High-Powered Flashlight or Fruit Ninja pre-
sent themselves as simple, even trivial consumer products 
or services; people expect them to be simply fun ways of 
outfitting their personal space (in the form of the app space 
on their phone).  Their creepiness lies in the realization that 
they are more than they seem – they are actually conduits 
for personal information to “leak” (intentionally) out of my 
personal space, indeed, out of myself. Upon discovering 
their underlying information gathering and dispersing na-
ture, I suddenly find that I am actually sharing my personal 
space with unknown, and unruly entities that I did not really 
invite in, regardless of the EULA. 
Telling people, in rational terms, that apps have this nature 
— of extending me beyond my personal space, and of al-
lowing outside influences in — is likely not enough. Per-
haps we (technologists) need to find ways to make people 
feel apps’ active, connective nature in some visceral way. 
So far, the only visceral way people feel these sensations of 
discomfort and personal zone invasion/boundary collapse is 
what gets termed creepy.  Are there more positive, visceral, 
affective responses that we could design for?  Or can apps 
become effectively transparent in this regard — rather than 
a EULA, their design itself communicating a sense of ac-
cess/thrill/risk (of both upside, and downside). 
Altman posited negative psychological consequences if the 
person whose privacy is repeatedly violated is unable to 
regain control and to successfully manage access to the self 
[3]. From our data, we are not able to demonstrate that there 
are long-term negative consequences for consumers (e.g., 
encouraging lower commitments to personal privacy or 
placing creepy aspects of their personal environments out of 
sight and out of mind).  But we suspect there are, perhaps 
through mechanisms that create and sustain bio-
neurological stress, the harmful health consequences of 
which are increasingly being documented. We also 
acknowledge that creepy experiences may not always be 
negative and unwanted, as recent HCI research into “un-
comfortable user experience” has begun to explore [6]. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis such as ours into negative emotional and moral 
reactions to smartphone app experience can be considered 
an exercise about values in design [13,20]. As our interview 
and survey respondents were able to articulate, their values 
and the values implicit in the design and behavior of certain 
smartphone apps were not well aligned [21]. 
From a values in design perspective, what is at stake here is 
the kind of future we want to live in, beyond just how we 
wish people would use apps and what kind of responsibility 
we wish they could take for their own data. The issue of 
designing the kinds of sharing and disclosure applications is 
in part hitting the right balance between what can be seen 
and what can be kept secret, between control and automa-
ticity. In part it is also about pushing changes in the norms 
around information sharing — we are fumbling with the 
now norms rather than looking to the where these norms 
might move as a result of technologies we are developing.  
Cultural norms change over time, subject to a great many 
short- and long-term forces, technical, economic, social, 
and legal. Acceptable entertainment app behavior in 2013 
will likely be different than in 2023.  This will not eliminate 
creepy experiences, but will change the conditions under 
which they are encountered. Nor does the inevitability of 
cultural change diminish the need for responsible, value-
sensitive design.  
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